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Abstract— State estimation estimates the system condition in 
real-time and provides a base case for other energy management 
system (EMS) applications including real-time contingency anal-
ysis and security-constrained economic dispatch. Recent work in 
the literature shows malicious cyber-attack can inject false meas-
urements that bypass traditional bad data detection in state esti-
mation and cause actual overloads. Thus, it is very important to 
detect such cyber-attack. In this paper, multiple metrics are pro-
posed to monitor abnormal load deviations and suspicious 
branch flow changes. A systematic two-stage approach is pro-
posed to detect false data injection (FDI) cyber-attack. The first 
stage determines whether the system is under attack while the 
second stage identifies the target branch. Numerical simulations 
verify that FDI can cause severe system violations and demon-
strate the effectiveness of the proposed two-stage FDI detection 
(FDID) method. It is concluded that the proposed FDID ap-
proach can efficiently detect FDI cyber-attack and identify the 
target branch, which will substantially improve operators’ situa-
tion awareness in real-time. 
 
Index Terms—Cyber-attack, false data injection, false data in-
jection detection, power system cyber-security, security-
constrained economic dispatch, state estimation. 
NOMENCLATURE 
Sets 
K Set of branches. 
KA Set of branches that have the top ten values for malicious 
load deviation index. 
K(n-) Set of branches with bus n as from-bus. 
K(n+) Set of branches with bus n as to-bus. 
N Set of buses. 
NL Set of load buses. 
NL(k) Set of load buses that are critical to branch k. 
 
Indices 
k branch. 
n bus. 
n(k-) From-bus of branch k. 
n(k+) To-bus of branch k. 
 
Parameters 
𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛0 Actual load at bus n at 𝑡𝑡 = 0. 
𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛0,𝑀𝑀 Load measurement at bus n at 𝑡𝑡 = 0. 
𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛− Actual load at bus n at 𝑡𝑡 = −∆𝑇𝑇. 
𝑙𝑙 Target branch l of FDI attack. 
𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆 Load shift factor. 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘 Thermal limit of branch k. 
𝑁𝑁1 Limit of an 𝑙𝑙1-norm constraint. 
𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘 Number of load buses that are critical to branch k. 
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𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙,0 Actual flow on target branch l at 𝑡𝑡 = 0. 
𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘0 Actual flow on branch k at 𝑡𝑡 = 0. 
𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘0,𝑀𝑀 Measurement of flow on branch k at 𝑡𝑡 = 0. 
𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘− Actual flow on branch k at 𝑡𝑡 = −∆𝑇𝑇. 
𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘+,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 Scheduled flow on branch k at 𝑡𝑡 = ∆𝑇𝑇, determined by 
SCED that runs at 𝑡𝑡 = 0. 
𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛,𝑘𝑘 Power transfer distribution factor for branch k due to an 
injection change at bus n. 
∆𝑇𝑇 Interval of a period. 
𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 Reactance of branch k. 
∆𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛 Actual load difference at bus n between t =0 and t =−∆𝑇𝑇. 
 
Variables 
𝑐𝑐 Attack vector of bus phase angles. 
∆?̃?𝑑𝑛𝑛 Malicious load deviation at bus n. 
𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 Post-attack actual flow on target branch l. 
𝑝𝑝�𝑙𝑙 Post-attack cyber flow on target branch l. 
𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 Post-attack actual flow on branch k. 
𝑝𝑝�𝑘𝑘 Post-attack cyber flow on branch k. 
∆𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 Difference between the post-attack actual power flow and 
cyber power flow on the target branch l. 
∆𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 Difference between the post-attack actual power flow and 
cyber power flow on branch k. 
𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛 Post-attack actual phase angle of bus n. 
𝜃𝜃�𝑛𝑛 Post-attack cyber phase angle of bus n. 
 
Functions 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥) 1 if x is positive; 0 if x is zero; -1 if x is negative. 
𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑆𝑆) Number of elements in the set S. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
n modern power systems, energy management systems 
(EMSs) are used to help system operators manage real-time 
operations. Key functions of EMS include state estimation 
(SE), real-time contingency analysis (RTCA) and real-time 
security-constrained economic dispatch (SCED). These func-
tions execute in a coordinated way such that the system relia-
bility can be maintained with least-cost solutions. 
State estimation executes routinely in real-time and serves 
as a core function in EMS for monitoring system condition. 
For instance, the SE at PJM, an independent system operator 
(ISO) in the United States, runs on a one-minute basis and can 
converge in 30-45 seconds [1]. With the measurement data 
received from remote terminal units (RTU) or local control 
centers through a communication network, state estimation 
can effectively estimate the system status and provide a basis 
for other subsequent applications in real-time. State estimation 
methods are based on the physical relationships of the power 
system and require data redundancy. 
The traditional bad data detection and identification module 
of SE can detect random bad data that are introduced by large 
measurement errors. It ensures the impact of random meas-
urement noises on SE is minimal. However, recent work [2]-
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[8] in the literature shows that malicious cyber-attack can in-
ject false measurements that are designed to meet the physical 
laws and bypass bad data detection. This indicates that power 
system state estimation is subject to false data injection (FDI) 
cyber-attack that may lead to physical consequences. Moreo-
ver, real-world cyber-attack example exists: in 2015, a cyber-
attack against the Ukraine power grid caused a serious physi-
cal blackout event, which is referred to as the first known suc-
cessful power system incident caused by a cyber-attack [9]. 
FDI cyber-attack on power system state estimation has 
gained significant attention since it was first proposed by Liu 
et al. in [2]: FDI cyber-attack injects coordinated false meas-
urements in an unobservable way such that the SE solutions 
are corrupted and may negatively affect operators real-time 
dispatch decisions. The attack model proposed in [2] and its 
impact are further analyzed, and more detailed results are pre-
sented in [3], as well as a generalized FDI cyber-attack model. 
Two regimes of attacks, a strong regime and a weak regime, 
are presented in [4]. The strong regime attack with access to a 
sufficient number of meters can launch unobservable attacks 
while the weak regime attack can be detected as only a limited 
number of meters are under control of the attacker. A graph 
theory based algorithm is proposed in [5] to identify the loca-
tions where attackers can attack with the least-number meas-
urements to keep the attack from being detected by AC state 
estimation. Thus, those locations may need more protection 
against potential FDI attacks. It is shown in [6] that the attack-
er can launch an unobservable attack by only introducing false 
measurements within a subgraph that is determined by the 
subgraph algorithm proposed in [5]. Extended on [6], a bi-
level optimization is proposed in [7] to maximize the physical 
flow on a target branch, which is equivalent to maximizing the 
branch overload. Though the FDI cyber-attack approach pro-
posed in [7] can cause unobservable branch overloads, it does 
not scale due to computational complexity. Therefore, three 
computationally efficient algorithms are proposed in [8] to 
speed-up the solution time and provide boundaries on system 
vulnerability. 
As illustrated in [2]-[8], power systems are subject to FDI 
cyber-attack and the attacker can invisibly compromise SE. 
Thus, SE under FDI cyber-attack may be corrupted and pro-
vide a biased base case for other EMS applications, which 
poses substantial risks on RTCA and SCED. A biased system 
condition may mislead system operators to take incorrect ac-
tions such as improper generation adjustment, which leads to 
severe violations or damage to the power system. Therefore, it 
is critical to ensure the SE results are correct. Developing FDI 
detection (FDID) strategies that can efficiently detect FDI 
cyber-attack is vital for reliability enhancements and secure 
operations of electric power systems. A number of methods 
have been proposed in the literature to address system vulner-
abilities due to FDI cyber-attack. These methods can be 
grouped into two categories [10]-[11]: (i) protection-based 
methods [12]-[19] and (ii) detection-based methods [20]-[25]. 
A greedy algorithm is proposed in [12] to select measure-
ments considering a budget constraint such that those meas-
urements will be encrypted for protection to maximize the 
system security. Reference [13] designed a fast greedy algo-
rithm to protect a subset of measurements for defending FDI 
cyber-attack. Known-secure PMUs are used to defense against 
FDI cyber-attack in [14]-[15], where a scheme is proposed to 
find the minimum number of necessary PMUs. A least-budget 
defense strategy, which can achieve quality solutions in a rea-
sonable time, is proposed in [16] to enhance state estimation 
against FDI cyber-attack by protecting critical meters. In [17], 
a specific set of measurements are selected and protected to 
detect FDI cyber-attack. The smallest set of measurements can 
be determined by the proposed two approaches, brute-force 
search and protecting basic measurements. A novel counter-
measure against FDI cyber-attack is proposed in [18] by pro-
tecting critical state variables, which is realized by protecting 
a minimum number of meter measurements; further, graphical 
methods are used to determine the minimum number of neces-
sary measurements [19]. The work presented in [12]-[19] are 
protection-based methods that share two drawbacks [11]: (i) 
data redundancy decreases; and (ii) protection is not absolute-
ly secure. SE can work more effectively with higher degree of 
redundancy; with a subset of trusted measurements only, the 
robustness and accuracy of SE solutions will drop. Moreover, 
the attacker may be able to compromise the protection that 
leads to the failure of protection-based methods. 
A novel FDID mechanism that uses nuclear norm minimi-
zation and low rank matrix factorization is proposed in [20] to 
separate nominal grid states and the anomalies. The Bayesian 
framework proposed in [21]-[22] can preserve and trace pos-
sible system states using prior information, which can detect 
false data by identifying statistically unlikely measurements. It 
is shown in [23] that random bad data injection can be identi-
fied by state estimation while stealth bad data injection can 
bypass state estimation; thus, [23] proposes a defense strategy 
against the stealth bad data injection by conducting real-time 
statistical analysis on a sequence of data at the minimum cost 
of delay. A three-phase mechanism is proposed in [24] to de-
tect FDI cyber-attack by evaluating spatiotemporal correlation 
between system states. A centralized FDI detector that is 
based on the generalized likelihood ratio and a distributed FDI 
detector that employs the adaptive level-triggered sampling 
technique are proposed in [25] to efficiently detect FDI cyber-
attack. The above methods [20]-[25] are classified as detec-
tion-based methods that do not rely on the protection on pre-
selected key measurements. However, those methods may not 
be able to detect the cyber-attack when the injected false data 
fit the distribution of previous measurements. 
In this paper, we propose a real-time systematic two-stage 
detection approach against FDI cyber-attack, which relies on 
neither key meter protection nor historical data. The proposed 
FDI detection method is based on an alert system with multi-
ple novel metrics; sensitivity factors such as power transfer 
distribution factors (PTDF) are used to calculate those devised 
metrics. With the proposed strategy, majority of the cyber-
attack events can be successfully detected in real-time. The 
contributions of this work are presented as follows: 
(i) The proposed two-stage FDID strategy is computa-
tionally tractable. The first stage determines whether 
the system is under FDI cyber-attack and the second 
stage identifies the target branch. 
(ii) The proposed metrics and alert system can effectively 
monitor abnormal load deviations and flow changes. 
(iii) The proposed approach can enhance SE by effectively 
detecting FDI cyber-attack in real-time and, thus im-
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prove system cyber-security. The proposed systematic 
FDID scheme is more robust since it depends on nei-
ther meter protection nor historical data. 
(iv) Simulation results demonstrate the proposed FDID 
scheme can efficiently detect FDI cyber-attack and 
identify the target branch; the results also show the 
false alarm rate and false dismissal rate are low. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
briefly introduces state estimation. Section III explains FDI 
cyber-attack. Section IV presents the proposed monitoring 
metrics, FDI cyber-attack alert system and systematic two-
stage FDID approach. Section V presents the numerical results 
for FDI and FDID. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper 
and Section VII presents the future work. 
II.  STATE ESTIMATION 
State estimation processes the data received from RTUs or 
local control centers and estimates the system status in real-
time. It provides a base case or a starting point for other EMS 
functions such as RTCA and SCED. Thus, state estimation is 
an essential function of EMS as it is the basis for other mod-
ules in EMS. The sequence of power system real-time opera-
tions is illustrated in Fig. 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Power system real-time operation sequence. 
 
SE is run continuously in real-time to estimate the system 
status including bus voltages and branch flows. The measure-
ment model for SE can be represented by (1). In (1), e denotes 
measurement error vector and h(x) describes the relationship 
between state variables x and measurements z. 
𝑠𝑠 = ℎ(𝑥𝑥) + 𝑠𝑠                                         (1) 
In this work, DC model is used to illustrate the proposed 
work. For DC state estimation, the relationship between state 
variables x and measurements z is linear and then, h(x) can be 
replaced by Hx, where H is a constant measurement function 
coefficient matrix. Thus, (1) can be replaced by (2) for DC 
state estimation. In (2), state variable x denotes nodal phase 
angle. This paper focuses on the DC model. 
𝑠𝑠 =  𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥 + 𝑠𝑠                                           (2) 
III.  FDI CYBER-ATTACK 
As discussed in the previous section, it is critical to ensure 
SE functions as other EMS modules depend on SE solutions. 
However, prior work in literature shows that FDI cyber-attack 
can compromise SE and cause unobservable branch overloads. 
Fig. 2. illustrates how a cyber-attack compromises the system 
by replacing true measurements with false measurements. 
To launch an unobservable FDI cyber-attack, the injected 
false measurements should meet (3) that represents the meas-
urement model under attack. In (3), 𝑥𝑥� denotes the state varia-
ble under attack and ?̃?𝑠 denotes the measurements under attack. 
Equation (4) defines the relationship between the actual state 
variable without attack and the cyber state variable under at-
tack; variable 𝑐𝑐 is referred to as attack vector in this paper. 
Note that the attacker cannot directly modify the state varia-
ble; rather, the attacker injects false measurements that indi-
rectly leads to biased estimates of the state variable. In addi-
tion, if the attacker targets at a specific state variable, then, all 
the measurements related to that state variable must be 
changed accordingly in order to cover such an attack.  ?̃?𝑠 = 𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥� + 𝑠𝑠                                         (3)  𝑥𝑥� = 𝑥𝑥 + 𝑐𝑐                                            (4) 
 
 
Fig. 2. Power system real-time operation under FDI cyber-attack. 
 
Fig. 3 shows the time line for illustrating the FDI cyber-
attack. There are two dispatch intervals shown in Fig. 3. In 
this work, it is assumed the attacker launches the FDI cyber-
attack at t = 0− that is before the start of the second period and 
the system information at t = −∆T is accurate. Due to opera-
tor’s generation re-dispatch, the actual power flows will 
change in the second period. It is assumed that the attacker 
does not have the capability of manipulating the generation 
measurements; rather, the attacker can inject false load meas-
urements, which is more realistic. Moreover, the attacker is 
assumed to have access to all load measurements, which rep-
resents the worst FDI cyber-attack scenario. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Time line for illustrating the FDI cyber-attack. 
 
In [7], a bi-level optimization model is proposed to deter-
mine the attack vector and false load vector that can cause the 
most severe loading level on a target transmission and may 
result in physical flow violation. To solve the problem in a 
timely manner, accelerating methods for providing fast solu-
tions to this bi-level model are proposed in [8]. A heuristic 
method proposed in [8] is enhanced in this work by consider-
ing the line flow directions and the associated model with B-𝜃𝜃 
power flow formulation is presented below, 
𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙,0)(𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 − 𝑝𝑝�𝑙𝑙) (5) 
subject to 
𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 = (𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛(𝑘𝑘−) − 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛(𝑘𝑘+))/𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 , 𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝐾 (6) 
𝑝𝑝�𝑘𝑘 = (𝜃𝜃�𝑛𝑛(𝑘𝑘−) − 𝜃𝜃�𝑛𝑛(𝑘𝑘+))/𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 , 𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝐾 (7) 
𝜃𝜃�𝑛𝑛 = 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛 + 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 , 𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑁𝑁 (8) 
∆?̃?𝑑𝑛𝑛 = ∑ (𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 − 𝑝𝑝�𝑘𝑘)𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝐾(𝑛𝑛−) −∑ (𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 − 𝑝𝑝�𝑘𝑘)𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝐾(𝑛𝑛+) , 𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿 (9) 
−𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛0 ≤ ∆?̃?𝑑𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛0 , 𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿 (10) 
−𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛 , 𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑁𝑁                                 (11) 
𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛 , 𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑁𝑁                                  (12) 
∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑁𝑁1                                       (13) 
The objective of this model is to maximize the difference 
between post-attack physical and cyber power flows on a pre-
specified target branch 𝑙𝑙. The attack problems for different 
target branches are independent and the case that leads to the 
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most severe overload will be considered as the worst case. The 
term sgn(x) in (5) denotes the sign function. Equations (6) and 
(7) calculate the post-attack physical and cyber branch flows 
respectively. Equation (8) shows the relationship between 
physical bus angles and cyber bus angles. Equation (9) calcu-
lates the malicious load deviation for each load bus while (10) 
ensures that the load shift is within limits. The summation of 
the absolute change in state variables is restricted by (11)-(13), 
which is equivalent to an 𝑙𝑙1-norm constraint [7]. 
The above model can be further simplified by introducing a 
new variable ∆𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 that denotes the difference between post-
attack physical and cyber power flows. Then, the simplified 
model can be represented by (10)-(17). This FDI cyber-attack 
model is implemented to provide the data required for the 
FDID studies in this paper. 
𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙,0)∆𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 (14) 
subject to (10)-(13) and 
∆𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 = (−𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛(𝑘𝑘−) + 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛(𝑘𝑘+))/𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 , 𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝐾 (15) 
∆?̃?𝑑𝑛𝑛 = ∑ (∆𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘)𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝐾(𝑛𝑛−) −∑ (∆𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘)𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝐾(𝑛𝑛+) , 𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿 (16) 
∆𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 = 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 − 𝑝𝑝�𝑘𝑘 , 𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝐾                             (17) 
IV.  FDID METHODOLOGY AND ALGORITHM 
A.  FDID Metrics 
Two categories of metrics are proposed in this paper to ef-
fectively detect potential FDI cyber-attacks. They are the 
branch overload risk index (BORI) and the malicious load 
deviation index (MLDI). BORI monitors suspicious changes 
in branch flows and identifies potential overloads, while 
MLDI can recognize load change patterns and identify mali-
cious load deviation. The proposed metrics BORI and MLDI 
are individual metrics for determining whether a specific 
branch is the attack target. Based on BORI and MLDI, sys-
tematic metrics and methodology are proposed, and they are 
presented in Section IV.B. In addition, this paper proposes an 
FDI cyber-attack alert system that has four different alert lev-
els defined as Danger, Warning, Monitor, and Normal. 
Branch Overload Risk Index 
To execute an unobservable FDI cyber-attack that would 
overload a branch, the attacker can change the measurements 
including load measurements that are sent to the system opera-
tor. In the cyber world, the attacker can deliberately reduce the 
flow on a congested line or a heavily loaded line by shifting 
loads. This would mislead operators to believe that there is 
extra available capacity on the target branch; then, operators 
may re-dispatch generation to take advantage of that extra 
available capacity and reduce the total cost. However, in the 
real world, there is no such extra available capacity and physi-
cal overloads may occur. Thus, based on this type of flow 
change pattern, a branch overload risk index is proposed in 
this work to detect FDI cyber-attacks. 
Since attackers may or may not consider the effects of gen-
eration re-dispatch, two similar but different metrics are pro-
posed in this paper: 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵1𝑘𝑘 and 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵2𝑘𝑘 that are defined in 
(18) and (19) respectively. 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵1𝑘𝑘 only considers the flow 
changes in the previous interval while 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵2𝑘𝑘 takes SCED 
into account. A comprehensive metric 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 is proposed to 
combine these two metrics. As shown in (20), 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 is de-
fined to be the larger value between 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵1𝑘𝑘 and 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵2𝑘𝑘. 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵1𝑘𝑘 = 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘−)(𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘− − 𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘0,𝑀𝑀 + 𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘−)/𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘    (18) 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵2𝑘𝑘 = 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘−)(𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘− − 𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘0,𝑀𝑀 + 𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘+,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)/𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘(19) 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 = 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵1𝑘𝑘,𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵2𝑘𝑘)                    (20) 
The alert level criteria for 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 is defined in Table I. In 
this table, 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 denotes the alert level associated with 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 
and it enables operators to determine whether a branch is un-
der attack from the viewpoint of flow violations. 
 
TABLE I ALERT LEVEL CRITERIA BASED ON 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 
Alert level 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 
Danger >115% 
Warning >110% 
Monitor >105% 
Normal <105% 
 
Malicious Load Deviation Index 
Power transfer distribution factors are widely used in power 
system operational applications. They are essentially sensitivi-
ty factors that measure the incremental change in branch flow 
due to a change in power transferring between a slack bus and 
a non-slack bus. Thus, given a branch k, the loads that have 
significant impacts on that branch should be monitored. It 
would be unusual if the changes in all the loads that are criti-
cal to branch k contribute to decreasing the flow on branch k. 
Therefore, based on this observation, a malicious load devia-
tion index is proposed to detect potential FDI cyber-attacks. 
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 is defined in (21), 
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 = 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘−) ∑ 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛,𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁(𝑘𝑘)𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑘𝑘   (21) 
where, 
𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛,𝑘𝑘 =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧−𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛,𝑘𝑘�  ,    𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛0,𝑀𝑀−𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛−𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛− ≤ −5%0      ,        𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 − 5% < 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛0,𝑀𝑀−𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛−
𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛−
< 5%
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛,𝑘𝑘)  ,    𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛0,𝑀𝑀−𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛−𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛− ≥ 5%  (22) 
and 
𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘 = 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿(𝑘𝑘))         (23) 
where 𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿(𝑘𝑘) denotes the load buses that are critical to branch 
k. If the absolute value of 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛,𝑘𝑘 is greater than or equal to 
1%, then, the associated load bus n is defined to be critical to 
branch k. The indicator, 𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛,𝑘𝑘, defined in (22), measures 
the impact of load change at bus n on the flow change on 
branch k; it is set to zero if the impact is insignificant. 
Though theoretically 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 is in the range of [-1, 1], it 
should be close to zero if loads fluctuate randomly. A positive 
value indicates that the load change may decrease the flow on 
branch k. A very high positive value may imply the load fluc-
tuation is abnormal and the probability of branch k being tar-
geted by an FDI attack is high. 
Metric 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 only considers the number of load buses that 
are critical to an individual branch, but it fails to take load 
magnitude and PTDF values into account. To consider those 
two factors, an enhanced malicious load deviation index 
(EMLDI) is proposed in this work. 𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 is defined in (24), 
𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 = 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘−)∑ (𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛,𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛,𝑘𝑘)𝑛𝑛∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁(𝑘𝑘)   (24) 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛,𝑘𝑘 denotes the influential factor for branch k due to 
the change in the load at bus n and it can be calculated by (25). 
𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛,𝑘𝑘 = �(𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛0,𝑀𝑀−𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛−)𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛,𝑘𝑘�∑ �(𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛0,𝑀𝑀−𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛−)𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛,𝑘𝑘�𝑛𝑛∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁(𝑘𝑘)      (25) 
𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 shares the same range and indication with 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘. 
However, load magnitude and PTDF values are not considered 
in 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 but are captured by 𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘. Thus, given a specific 
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potential target branch k, 𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 may be a better indicator to 
determine whether there is an attack targeting that branch. 
Though the alert level criteria for 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 and 𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 defined 
in Table II are the same, 𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 should be used for deter-
mining the alert level since it captures more factors than 
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘. 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘 denotes the alert level associated with 𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘. 
 
TABLE II ALERT LEVEL CRITERIA BASED ON 𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 
Alert level 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 or 𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 
Danger >50% 
Warning >35% 
Monitor >20% 
Normal <20% 
 
 
B.  Two-stage FDID Approach 
Metrics MLDI and BORI presented in Section IV.A are 
used to detect potential FDI cyber-attack on a specific branch 
rather than to monitor the system as a whole. Thus, a system-
atic two-stage FDID approach, consisting of an FDI attack 
awareness stage and a target branch identification stage, is 
proposed in this paper to detect FDI cyber-attack. The first 
stage is to determine whether the system is under FDI cyber-
attack and the second stage would identify the target branch. 
Stage 1: FDI Attack Awareness 
MLDI and BORI are proposed to detect whether an FDI 
cyber-attack is launched for a specific branch. Since system 
operators have limited information regarding which branch the 
attacker would target, it is necessary to calculate the metrics 
for all branches. However, given that a practical power system 
typically has a large number of branches, even random load 
fluctuations may cause large values of 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘, 𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘, and 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 for a few branches, which may mislead system opera-
tors to believe that the load fluctuation is abnormal and the 
system is under attack. Therefore, a system-wide malicious 
load deviation index (SMLDI) is proposed to resolve this is-
sue. SMLDI is defined in the equation shown below, 
𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 = ∑ 𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾
𝑠𝑠𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾)          (26) 
where KA is a set of ten branches that have top ten 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 
values. If the number of load buses that have significant ef-
fects on branch k is too small, then the associated 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 are 
not used for malicious load deviation recognition and branch k 
will not be included in the set KA. In this work, branches that 
have less than five critical load buses will not be considered as 
a candidate element of set KA. 
In this stage, SMLDI is used as the metric to determine 
whether the system is under attack. Similar to the alert level 
designed for a target branch, a system-wide FDI cyber-attack 
alert level is defined in Table III. A system would be consid-
ered to be FDI cyber-attack free if the associated alert level is 
marked as Normal or Monitor in the first stage. Only the cases 
that have either Warning or Danger alert flags will be sent to 
the second stage for target branch identification. 
 
 
TABLE III ALERT LEVEL CRITERIA BASED ON SMLDI 
Alert level 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 
Danger >50% 
Warning >35% 
Monitor >20% 
Normal <20% 
 
Stage 2: Target Branch Identification 
It is vital to determine whether the system is under mali-
cious FDI cyber-attack in Stage 1. It is also very important to 
identify the branch that the attacker targets so that operators 
can take immediate actions to handle the detected attack. 
𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 detects the attack by monitoring suspicious load 
deviations while 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 detects FDI attacks from the view-
point of potential flow violations. The alert level 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘 associ-
ated with 𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 and the alert level 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 associated with 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 can be combined into a single comprehensive attack 
alert level, which is defined in Table IV. This combined alert 
level, denoted by 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘, is used to identify the target branch. 
Though the proposed alert system can provide a qualitative 
analysis, it is also very important to analyze the FDI cyber-
attack quantitatively. Thus, a comprehensive attack index 
(CAI) that considers both load deviation patterns and potential 
branch overloads is proposed in this work. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 is defined in 
(27). The branches that have the largest 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 are considered to 
be the most suspicious target branches. Moreover, the 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 
rank indicates the possibility of branch k being targeted. 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 =  𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘       (27) 
Therefore, both the proposed comprehensive attack index 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 and the proposed comprehensive alert level 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘 will be 
used to identify the target branch in Stage 2. The branches that 
are either marked as Danger or have a 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 ranking in the top 
three are considered as the most suspicious target branches. 
 
TABLE IV DETERMINATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ALERT LEVEL 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘 
𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘 
𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 Normal Monitor Warning Danger 
Normal Normal Monitor Monitor Warning 
Monitor Monitor Monitor Warning Warning 
Warning Monitor Warning Warning Danger 
Danger Warning Warning Danger Danger 
 
C.  Enhanced EMS with FDID 
Since the proposed FDI cyber-attack detection is independ-
ent with existing EMS applications, it can be considered as a 
separate module that processes measurements in the first place 
before state estimation runs. The added FDID module will 
neither change the current EMS structure nor each single EMS 
application. The flowchart shown in Fig. 4 illustrates the pro-
posed FDID method and how it integrates with current power 
system real-time operations. If no FDI cyber-attack events are 
identified, EMS will execute ordinarily; otherwise, special 
protection schemes will be activated to handle the identified 
cyber-attack events. For instance, a higher value of the initial 
line flow and/or a lower value of the line capacity can be used 
for the attacked target line to offset the impact of the FDI 
cyber-attack since tampered measurements may not be identi-
fied and corrected instantly. This paper focuses on the real-
time situation awareness for system operators and special pro-
tection scheme under FDI cyber-attack that can be considered 
as a third stage to the proposed two-stage FDID approach is 
out of the scope of this work. 
V.  CASE STUDIES 
The IEEE 118-bus test system is used in this paper to inves-
tigate the proposed FDI cyber-attack model and examine the 
proposed two-stage FDID approach. This system has 118 bus-
es, 186 branches, and 19 online units. Out of 118 buses, 99 
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buses are load buses. The initial total load is 4,242 MW. The 
detailed result analysis on the IEEE 118-bus test system are 
presented in Section V.A and Section V.B. In addition, ro-
bustness analysis is presented in Section V.C to demonstrate 
the developed FDID approach with the proposed metrics on 
the same IEEE 118-bus test system under different network 
configurations and two other different test systems: IEEE 
RTS96 system and the Polish system. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Flowchart of the proposed FDID method. 
 
A.  FDI Results 
To study the effectiveness of the proposed FDI cyber-attack 
model, numerical simulations are conducted with different 
scenarios including constant load scenarios and random load 
fluctuation scenarios in the first dispatch interval. The effects 
of different load shift factors and 𝑙𝑙1-norm constraint limits on 
the physical consequences of an FDI cyber-attack are ana-
lyzed. After all possible branches are studied, branch 111 and 
branch 118 are selected as the target branch to illustrate the 
proposed work since these two branches correspond to the 
worst two cyber-attacks that cause the most severe overloads. 
With the assumption that load profile does not change, the 
resulted power flows on branch 111 and branch 118 at t = 0 
with different attack settings are presented in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 
respectively. The blue curve with diamond markers in Fig. 5 
corresponds to the FDI results with a load shift factor of 5% 
and it becomes flat very quickly. The reason is that the load 
shift constraint becomes binding when 𝑁𝑁1 increases to 6 and 
further relaxing the 𝑙𝑙1-norm constraint will not affect the re-
sults. Since the FDI model used in this work is a fast heuristic 
rather than an exact approach, the flows shown in Fig. 5 and 
Fig. 6 do not strictly increase with the load shift factor and the 
𝑙𝑙1-norm constraint limit. However, with more flexible condi-
tions, attacker can typically cause more severe flow violations. 
Note that the attacker is assumed to have access to all load 
measurements to simulate the worst scenario case. As a result, 
most load measurements, if not all, are altered to maximize the 
impact of the FDI cyber-attack. For instance, with 𝑁𝑁1 being 5 
and load shift factor being 10%, out of 99 nodal load meas-
urements, 94 nodal load measurements are tampered to 
achieve the maximum overload on the target branch 118. 
In reality, loads fluctuate all the time. Thus, it is very im-
portant to analyze the effects of random load fluctuations on 
FDI cyber-attacks. It is assumed that load fluctuation follows 
the normal distribution with a mean of 𝜇𝜇 (a percentage) and a 
standard deviation of 𝜎𝜎 (a percentage), which is denoted by 
N(𝜇𝜇, σ). The process of generating a load fluctuation vector 
following N(𝜇𝜇, 𝜎𝜎) is presented below: 
1) generate a vector 𝑣𝑣 that follows standard normal dis-
tribution. 
2) apply a cutoff value 1.96 to this vector 𝑣𝑣. 
3) adjust 𝑣𝑣 with equation: 𝑣𝑣 = 𝑣𝑣𝜎𝜎 + 𝜇𝜇. 
4) create a load fluctuation vector: ∆𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛 = 𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛−𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛,∀𝑠𝑠. 
Note that since loads do not fluctuate significantly in a 
short-term, the second step would ensure the random load 
fluctuation does not have a long tail distribution. The cutoff 
value 1.96 corresponds to a confidence interval of 95%. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Maximum power flow on branch 111 with constant load under FDI 
cyber-attacks with various load shift factors and 𝑙𝑙1-norm constraint limits. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Maximum power flow on branch 118 with constant load under FDI 
cyber-attacks with various load shift factors and 𝑙𝑙1-norm constraint limits. 
 
For the FDI simulations conducted in this section, the ran-
dom load fluctuations follow the normal distribution of N(0, 
3%). For each attack simulated, the load profile will be updat-
ed with a different randomly generated load fluctuation vector. 
The results of FDI cyber-attacks with load fluctuation are pre-
sented in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8. Fig. 7 shows the results of attacks 
targeting branch 111 while Fig. 8 shows the results of attacks 
targeting branch 118. The curves in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 look very 
similar to the corresponding curves in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 respec-
tively. This indicates that the impact of random load fluctua-
tion on FDI cyber-attack is limited. Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 show that 
an FDI cyber-attack can still result in a flow violation on the 
target branch even with random load fluctuations. 
B.  FDID Results 
Stage 1: FDI Attack Awareness 
The proposed FDID strategy consists of two stages. Stage 1 
determines whether the system is under an FDI cyber-attack 
by analyzing the load profile change pattern. It is important to 
detect the attack and it is also vital to bypass normal random 
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load fluctuations. The goal of Stage 1 is to have a low proba-
bility of false alarm and a low probability of false dismissal. 
Two sets of system scenarios with different load deviation 
vectors, including FDI malicious load deviation vectors and 
random load fluctuation vectors, are tested in this stage. 
The load deviation vector denotes the difference between 
the loads at the beginning of the second dispatch interval (t = 
0+) and the loads at the beginning of the first dispatch interval. 
The malicious load deviation vectors are obtained from the 
160 different attacks performed in Section IV.A. The normal 
load fluctuation vectors are created with four different normal 
distributions: N(0, 3%), N(0, 5%), N(-1%, 3%), and N(1%, 
3%). Twenty independent vectors are generated for each nor-
mal distribution and thus, the second set of system scenarios 
correspond to 80 load fluctuation vectors. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Maximum power flow on branch 111 with random load fluctuation 
under FDI cyber-attacks. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Maximum power flow on branch 118 with random load fluctuation 
under FDI cyber-attacks. 
 
The SMLDI values for those 240 scenarios are calculated in 
Stage 1. The results for the 160 FDI malicious load deviation 
vectors and the 80 random load fluctuation vectors are pre-
sented in Table V and Table VI respectively. The SMLDI val-
ues for random load fluctuations are very small and the aver-
ages are close to zero. However, the SMLDI values with at-
tack are much bigger and the average values are around 70%. 
This indicates that FDI cyber-attacks are successfully detected 
with the proposed metric SMLDI and random load fluctua-
tions can successfully bypass the proposed FDID approach. 
Fig. 9 shows a scatter plot of the SMLDI values for the ran-
dom load fluctuations and FDI cyber-attacks. The blue squares 
correspond to the random load fluctuations while the red tri-
angles correspond to the FDI cyber-attacks. As shown in Fig. 
9, the SMLDI values for random load fluctuations are all be-
low 35% and the associated alert levels are either Normal or 
Monitor. Moreover, the alert levels for most random vectors 
are Normal. As for the FDI cyber-attacks, the associated 
SMLDI values are all above the Warning tolerance and the 
alert levels for most attacks are Danger. This demonstrates the 
proposed metric SMLDI can efficiently detect FDI cyber-
attack and would not mistakenly identify a random load fluc-
tuation as an FDI cyber-attack. In other words, the results pre-
sented in Fig. 9 demonstrate the proposed FDID scheme has a 
low false alarm rate as well as a low false dismissal rate. 
The first 80 system scenarios in Fig. 9 correspond to ran-
dom load fluctuations with four different normal distributions. 
They are listed in the order of N(0, 3%), N(0, 5%), N(-1%, 
3%), and N(1%, 3%). Each normal distribution has 20 scenar-
ios. By comparing the random load fluctuations generated 
with different normal distributions, it is observed that the 
mean of load fluctuation does not significantly affect the met-
ric while higher standard deviations may result in higher 
SMLDI values. This is consistent with the statistics presented 
in Table VI. This implies that the false alarm rate for the pro-
posed approach would increase as the magnitude of load fluc-
tuation increases. It is worth noting that loads typically do not 
deviate substantially in a short time frame. 
 
TABLE V SMLDI VALUES FOR FDI CYBER-ATTACKS 
 Attack on branch 118 Attack on branch 111 
Constant load N(0, 3%) Constant load N(0, 3%) 
max 97.8% 97.8% 97.8% 97.5% 
min 48.8% 39.9% 35.7% 38.7% 
median 62.9% 68.5% 62.9% 63.8% 
average 72.1% 74.5% 68.6% 70.7% 
std 16.8% 19.0% 19.4% 20.3% 
 
TABLE VI SMLDI VALUES FOR RANDOM LOAD FLUCTUATIONS 
 Normal load fluctuation and no FDI attack 
N(0, 3%) N(0, 5%) N(-1%, 3%) N(1%, 3%) 
max 23.1% 28.0% 23.5% 20.9% 
min 3.2% 13.8% 5.5% 7.5% 
median 11.8% 22.8% 12.0% 12.5% 
average 12.2% 21.7% 12.4% 13.2% 
std 4.4% 3.7% 4.7% 3.7% 
 
 
Fig. 9. SMLDI values for random load fluctuations and FDI cyber-attacks. 
 
Fig. 10 illustrates the SMLDI values that are associated 
with various FDI attacks targeting branch 118 with random 
load fluctuations that follow N(0, 3%). The red dotted straight 
line is the boundary between the alert levels Monitor and 
Warning. Those SMLDI values are well above the Warning 
alert tolerance of 35%, especially for the cases that have more 
flexible attack constraints. It is very straightforward and effi-
cient to identify whether the system is under malicious FDI 
cyber-attack with the proposed metric SMLDI. 
The results shown in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 correspond to the 
metric SMLDI defined in (26), where the set KA consists of 10 
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branches that have top ten 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 values. In order to further 
justify the proposed metric, sensitivity of the metric perfor-
mance to the number of branches in set KA for calculating 
SMLDI is conducted; Fig. 11 shows the SMLDI values with 8 
branches while Fig. 12 shows the SMLDI values with 12 
branches. It is observed that the results shown in Fig. 11 and 
Fig. 12 closely match the results shown in Fig. 9 and they all 
show there is a clear line cut between FDI cyber-attack scenar-
ios and normal random load fluctuation scenarios. This indi-
cates that the proposed metric performance is not very sensi-
tive to the number of branches for calculating SMLDI. To be 
consistent, for the rest of this paper, KA is defined as a set of 
10 branches that have the highest ten 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 values. 
 
 
Fig. 10. SMLDI of FDI attacks targeting branch 118 with a random load fluc-
tuation of N(0, 3%). 
 
 
Fig. 11. SMLDI values for random load fluctuations and FDI cyber-attacks 
when set KA consists of 8 branches that have top 8 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 values. 
 
 
 
Fig. 12. SMLDI values for random load fluctuations and FDI cyber-attacks 
when set KA consists of 12 branches that have top 12 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 values. 
 
Stage 2: Target Branch Identification 
In the second stage, only the cases that are identified to be 
under FDI cyber-attack will be examined. Thus, only those 
160 FDI attack scenarios identified in the first stage are sent to 
the target branch identification routine. 
Table VII shows the results of target branch identification 
against the FDI attacks on branch 111 with no random load 
fluctuations and a load shift factor of 10% in the attack model. 
The metric 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 for branch 111 ranks first for nine scenarios 
out of the ten scenarios and ranks second for the remaining 
one scenario. There are eight scenarios for which a branch 
marked as Danger exists; and branch 111 is the only one that 
is marked as Danger for those eight scenarios. Therefore, both 
the proposed comprehensive FDI attack index and the pro-
posed comprehensive alert level successfully indicate branch 
111 is the most suspicious target. 
Table VIII shows the results of target branch identification 
against the FDI attacks on branch 111 with a random load 
fluctuation that follows N(0, 3%) and a load shift factor of 
10% in the attack model. The simulations corresponding to 
Table VII do not involve random load fluctuations while the 
simulations for Table VIII do. Thus, the results shown in Ta-
ble VIII are more realistic. However, the conclusions drawn 
from Table VIII are consistent with Table VII. This indicates 
that the proposed strategy is also effective even when load 
fluctuation is considered. 
 
TABLE VII TARGET BRANCH IDENTIFICATION RESULTS FOR FDI ATTACKS ON 
BRANCH 111 WITH NO RANDOM LOAD FLUCTUATIONS AND A LOAD SHIFT 
FACTOR OF 10% IN THE ATTACK MODEL 
 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵111 
Rank of 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵111 
𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴111 
Number of lines 
marked Danger 
N1 = 1 0.46 2 Monitor 0 
N1 = 2 0.66 1 Warning 0 
N1 = 3 0.90 1 Danger 1 
N1 = 4 1.13 1 Danger 1 
N1 = 5 1.26 1 Danger 1 
N1 = 6 1.30 1 Danger 1 
N1 = 7 1.27 1 Danger 1 
N1 = 8 1.27 1 Danger 1 
N1 = 9 1.26 1 Danger 1 
N1 = 10 1.26 1 Danger 1 
 
TABLE VIII. TARGET BRANCH IDENTIFICATION RESULTS FOR FDI ATTACKS 
ON BRANCH 111 WITH N(0, 3%) RANDOM LOAD FLUCTUATION IN THE FIRST 
INTERVAL AND A LOAD SHIFT FACTOR OF 10% IN THE ATTACK MODEL 
 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵111 
Rank of 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵111 
𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴111 
Number of lines 
marked Danger 
N1 = 1 0.45 2 Monitor 0 
N1 = 2 0.68 1 Warning 0 
N1 = 3 0.91 1 Danger 1 
N1 = 4 1.07 1 Danger 1 
N1 = 5 1.21 1 Danger 1 
N1 = 6 1.37 1 Danger 2 
N1 = 7 1.19 1 Danger 1 
N1 = 8 1.29 1 Danger 2 
N1 = 9 1.23 1 Danger 1 
N1 = 10 1.20 1 Danger 1 
 
Table IX presents the FDID results on various FDI attacks. 
As shown in this table, the target branches are correctly identi-
fied for 96.9% or 155 out of 160 FDI cyber-attacks. The target 
branch is marked as Danger for over 90% of the FDI attacks 
on branch 118. The percentage of the cases that the target 
branch of the FDI attacks on branch 111 is marked as Danger 
is relatively low. The reason is that the overloads on branch 
111 for most FDI attacks with a load shift factor of 5%, are 
insignificant and do not reach the Warning alert threshold. 
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However, the associated comprehensive FDI attack index of 
the target branch 111 ranks first for most cases. For all FDID 
tests on the 160 FDI attacks, the comprehensive attack indices 
of the target branch rank very high and almost all of them rank 
either first or second. 
 
TABLE IX RESULTS OF FDID ON VARIOUS FDI ATTACKS 
 
Average 
𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 
rank of 
the 
target 
branch 
Percent of 
scenarios 
for which 
the target 
branch is 
identified 
Percent of 
scenarios for 
which the 
target branch 
is marked as 
Danger 
# of 
scenarios 
simulated 
Attack on 
branch 
118 
Constant 
load 1.58 92.5% 92.5% 40 
N(0, 3%) 1.55 100% 92.5% 40 
Attack on 
branch 
111 
Constant 
load 1.13 100% 65% 40 
N(0, 3%) 1.33 95.0% 77.5% 40 
Cumulative statistics  1.39 96.9% 81.9% 160 
 
C.  Robustness Analysis 
To validate the robustness of the proposed FDID metrics 
and approach and show that they can be generalized to differ-
ent network configurations and different systems, this sub-
section conducts extensive robustness analysis studies. 
IEEE 118-Bus System under Different Configurations 
It is very common that practical power systems experience 
outages including planned outage for component maintenance 
and unplanned outage that is also referred to as contingency 
[26]. This indicates that the network configuration of a practi-
cal power system varies in different time periods. Thus, it is 
very important to examine the proposed approach under dif-
ferent grid configurations. In this work, three configurations 
denoted as CNFRTN-1, CNFRTN-2, and CNFRTN-3 are 
studied and they correspond to three random single outages: 
an outage on branch 1, an outage on branch 71, and an outage 
on branch 141 respectively. Normal random load fluctuations 
without cyber-attack and FDI cyber-attacks on the same 
branch 111 and branch 118 with and without noises are simu-
lated on the 118-bus test system under those three configura-
tions respectively. The normal load fluctuation scenarios are 
represented by four sets of ten independent vectors generated 
for four normal distributions respectively: N(0, 3%), N(0, 5%), 
N(-1%, 3%), and N(1%, 3%). The 32 FDI attack vectors corre-
sponds to two target branches under various attack conditions 
(with 𝑁𝑁1 being 5 and 10 respectively, and load shift factor 
being 5%, 10%, 15% and 20% respectively). 
The resulted power flows on the target branch 118 under the 
base case configuration and three variations are illustrated in 
Fig. 13. From this figure, we can conclude that the network 
configuration change does not significantly affect the FDI 
cyber-attack results on maximizing the target branch flow. The 
FDID results under different system network configurations 
are shown in Table X. It is observed that the proposed FDID 
method can effectively detect the malicious FDI cyber-attack 
scenarios and will not mistakenly identify normal random load 
fluctuation scenarios as FDI cyber-attacks; moreover, the pro-
posed FDID approach achieves very similar results under dif-
ferent configurations. 
 
 
Fig. 13. Maximum power flow on branch 118 with constant load under FDI 
cyber-attacks against different network configurations. 
 
 
TABLE X RESULTS OF FDID ON DIFFERENT SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS 
 
Stage 1: Random load fluctuations scenarios Stage 1: FDI cyber-attack scenarios Stage 2 
# of scenari-
os simulated 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠1 
SMLDI # of scenari-
os simulated 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠2 
SMLDI # of scenari-
os simulated 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠3 max min avg max min avg 
CNFRTN-1 40 0% 28% 7% 15% 32 100% 98% 47% 79% 32 100% 
CNFRTN-2 40 0% 29% 7% 15% 32 100% 98% 47% 79% 32 100% 
CNFRTN-3 40 0% 29% 7% 15% 32 100% 98% 48% 77% 32 100% 
Note that 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠1 denotes the percentage of normal random load fluctuation scenarios that are mistakenly identified as FDI cyber-attacks; 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠2 denotes the 
percentage of malicious FDI cyber-attack scenarios that are successfully detected; 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠3 denotes the percentage of FDI cyber-attack scenarios of which the 
target branches are identified. 
 
 
IEEE RTS-96 System 
The IEEE RTS-96 system is a commonly studied test sys-
tem that has 73 buses and 117 branches. Two highly loaded 
branches are selected as the target: branch 62 and branch 99. 
This work simulated a total of 40 FDI cyber-attack scenarios 
that correspond to the two target branches with and without 
consideration of load fluctuations under various attack condi-
tions (with 𝑁𝑁1 being 1 through 10 respectively, and load shift 
factor being 10%). The 40 normal load fluctuation scenarios 
are created with the same procedure for the IEEE 118-bus 
system under different configurations. 
Fig. 14 shows branch overloads in MW due to FDI cyber-
attack. Ln62c and Ln99c represent the overload on branch 62 
and branch 99 respectively with the assumption that load does 
change while Ln62f and Ln99f show the overload when con-
sidering load fluctuation. The Ln62c and Ln99c curves are 
non-decreasing as the attack parameter 𝑁𝑁1 increases. As 
demonstrated by the Ln62f and Ln99f curves, load fluctuations 
may only slightly affect the attack impact. 
Fig. 15 presents the SMLDI values for normal load fluctua-
tion scenarios and FDI cyber-attack scenarios on the IEEE 
RTS-96 73-bus test system. We can observe that the metric 
levels used for the IEEE 118-bus test system can also clearly 
distinct the FDI cyber-attacks and normal load fluctuations on 
this IEEE 73-bus system. All FDI cyber-attacks are detected 
and target branches are identified for this test system. 
 
 10 
 
Fig. 14. Branch overload under FDI cyber-attacks on the 73-bus test system. 
 
 
 
Fig. 15. SMLDI values for random load fluctuations and FDI cyber-attacks on 
the IEEE RTS-96 73-bus test system. 
 
Polish System 
Numerical simulations are conducted on the Polish system 
that has 2,383 buses to further demonstrate the robustness of 
the proposed approach. Five highly loaded branches are se-
lected as the FDI cyber-attack target. Sixteen FDI cyber-attack 
scenarios are designed for each target branch; they differ in 
the attack parameters (𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆 and 𝑁𝑁1) and load profiles. The 80 
normal load fluctuation scenarios are created with the same 
procedure as Section V.B. Simulation results show the FDI 
cyber-attacks can cause violations on the Polish system; for 
example, it leads to an average of 15.2 MW branch overload 
when attack parameter 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆 is set to 10% and 𝑁𝑁1 is set to 10 and 
load fluctuation is ignored. 
Table XI presents the FDI cyber-attack detection results. 
The average and median of the proposed SMLDI metric val-
ues for 80 FDI cyber-attack scenarios are both over 70%, 
which is way above the warning alert level 35%; the minimum 
SMLDI metric value is 38% that will also trigger the alert 
system and the associated FDI cyber-attack will be sent to 
Stage 2 for target branch identification. In Stage 2, the target 
branch are corrected identified for 74 (92.5%) attack scenarios 
when using the comprehensive attack index only; the target for 
54 (67.5%) attack scenarios are marked as DANGER that im-
plies the associated branch is highly likely to be the target. 
Overall, the target branch identification in the second stage 
has a success rate of 97.5%. As for the 80 normal load fluctua-
tion scenarios, only one single scenario with the metric 
SMLDI being 36% (slightly above 35%) is mistakenly identi-
fied as a potential FDI cyber-attack. 
D.  Discussions 
In this case studies section, the proposed two-stage FDID 
strategy is demonstrated with numerical simulations on three 
test systems and the variations with different configurations of 
the 118-bus system. The proposed metrics and alert system 
can efficiently detect potential FDI cyber-attacks by monitor-
ing abnormal load deviations and flow changes. Thus, we can 
conclude that the proposed two-stage FDID approach is effec-
tive and robust. One key factor that affects the proposed detec-
tion method is the selection of metric level thresholds. A good 
practice is to train enough datasets including both normal load 
fluctuation vectors and FDI cyber-attack vectors, calculate the 
metric values for both vector sets, and then a cutoff line (met-
ric tolerance) can be determined to clearly separate the two 
types of scenarios. The optimal metric thresholds for different 
systems can be very similar, which has been demonstrated in 
this work; the same metric tolerances can effectively detect all 
FDI cyber-attacks and filter out normal load fluctuations on 
three very different systems: the IEEE RTS-96 73-bus system, 
the IEEE 118-bus system, and the Polish 2383-bus system. 
 
TABLE XI RESULTS OF FDID ON THE POLISH SYSTEM 
 
Random load 
fluctuations 
scenarios 
FDI cyber-
attack 
scenarios 
Stage 1 
SMLDI 
max 36% 92% 
min 10% 38% 
median 23% 73% 
average 23% 71% 
std 6% 16% 
# of scenarios simulated 80 80 
# of scenarios identified 
as FDI cyber-attack 1 80 
Stage 2 
# of scenarios that the 
target ranks top 3 of CAI 
N/A 
74 
(92.5%) 
# of scenarios that the 
target is marked as 
DANGER 
54 
(67.5%) 
Overall success rate 78 (97.5%) 
 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
An FDI cyber-attack model is first introduced in this paper 
to examine the effects of FDI attacks on system reliability. 
Then, a two-stage systematic approach that does not rely on 
meter protection or historical data is proposed to detect FDI 
cyber-attack. The proposed FDI detection method is based on 
an alert system with the devised novel metrics. Two categories 
of metrics, MLDI and BORI, are proposed in this two-stage 
approach to determine whether the change in system condition 
is abnormal. MLDI recognizes malicious load changes while 
BORI identifies suspicious flow changes. Sensitivity factors 
like PTDFs are used to calculate the regular MLDI and the 
enhanced MLDI. In the first stage, the proposed system-wide 
MLDI is used to determine whether the system is under attack. 
If the system is deemed to be under attack, the second stage 
will execute and the proposed alert system along with the pro-
posed comprehensive FDI attack index will be used to identify 
the attack target branch. 
Simulation results show that FDI cyber-attack can cause 
physical flow violations and demonstrate the effectiveness of 
the proposed FDID metrics, FDI cyber-attack alert system and 
two-stage FDID approach. The proposed two-stage FDID ap-
proach successfully detects all FDI cyber-attacks that are sim-
ulated in this work and correctly identifies the target branch 
with a success rate of over 95%. In addition, random load fluc-
tuations would not trigger the alert system. Numerical simula-
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tions show that almost none of random load fluctuation sce-
narios is mistakenly identified as malicious cyber-attacks. To 
conclude, normal load fluctuations will not activate the pro-
posed FDI alert system while the proposed two-stage FDID 
approach can efficiently detect FDI cyber-attack and the target 
branch. In other words, the false alarm rate and false dismissal 
rate for the proposed two-stage FDID approach are low. 
VII.  FUTURE WORK 
Although this paper has demonstrated the performance of 
the proposed metric-based FDI cyber-attack alert system and 
the effectiveness of the developed two-stage systematic detec-
tion approach, there are still room for improvement to this 
work. Key future work beyond this paper is to: (i) replace the 
simplified DC SE based FDI model with an enhanced FDI 
model using full AC SE that is consistent with industrial prac-
tice and is more accurate; (ii) add AC RTCA module in the 
loop to simulate the entire EMS; (iii) upgrade the current two-
stage FDID approach to an enhanced three-stage FDID ap-
proach by adding a third stage for identifying tampered meas-
urements and determining the associated special protection 
schemes. 
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